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Abstract
The Eurozone crisis exposed the incompleteness of the Economic and Monetary Union’s governance framework thereby
prompting the promotion of a multitude of reform packages and proposals. This simultaneously induced conflict among
EU governments on both design and content of such reforms. In case of the financial transaction tax (FTT) proposal, which
failed to garner consensus among member governments, it illustrates Ireland’s disapproval clashing with favorable German
and French stances. While these governments aligned on the necessity to reform, the process of harmonizing EU finan-
cial governance proved rather difficult. In analyzing governments’ variation of reform support or opposition, the soci-
etal approach to governmental preference formation is employed. This is considerably conducive in directing academic
attention to the role of two explanatory variables, domestic material interests and value-based ideas, in shaping gov-
ernments’ reform positions. This article encompasses a comprehensive comparative account of domestic preference for-
mation and responsiveness of three EU governments (France, Germany and Ireland), in the case study of the FTT, and
demonstrates that the two societal dynamics are prone to have played a role in shaping financial reform controversies.
By building on and contributing to Eurozone crisis literature, this approach seems appropriate in analyzing financial gover-
nance reform due to the crisis’ domestic impact resulting in increased public salience, issue politicization and an advanced
role of elected politicians.
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1. Introduction
The outbreak of the financial and Eurozone crisis in
2010, highlighting the deficiencies of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) governance framework, led to a
swift consensus amongst the heads of state and govern-
ment of the European Union (EU) “to restore the sound-
ness and stability of the European financial system”
(European Council, 2010, p. 6). Although the necessity
to act sparked immediate response, in the form of the
European Commission proposing multiple reform pack-
ages and proposals, Burns, Clifton, and Quaglia (2018,
p. 372) argue that no considerable alterations have been
undertaken at reforming financial regulation: “EU post
crisis financial regulation underwent only incremental
change, rather than transformation.” While the finan-
cial and Eurozone crisis immediately increased financial
regulation’s salience and called for prompt substantial
action, considerations on financial reforms’ acceleration
and design oftentimes induced controversies between
individual member governments (van Loon, 2018). Due
to the unanimous decision making procedure several
governments acted as veto players in delaying or block-
ing reform proposals on the EU level. One considerably
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contested reform proposal, which failed to garner con-
sensus among member governments and still lingers in
the reform pipeline, the financial transaction tax (FTT),
serves as a case in point. The FTT, as an instrument of
regulating the financial market, will have an influence
on the banking sector in the EU in particular, and shape
the overall outcome of the banking union (Högenauer,
2021). It was disapproved by Ireland (Hardiman &
Metinsoy, 2019) clashing with favorable German and
French stances (van Loon, in press). Consensus and desir-
ability for financial regulation reform have thus, at times,
been severely constrained.
In explaining governments’ variation of reform sup-
port or opposition, a turn to the domestic level of
European financial governance demonstrates that these
governments equally faced potential veto players within
their countries’ societies. Pursuing the line of reason-
ing that the urgent, uncertain threatening crisis situa-
tion advanced political contestation, a so-called politi-
cization (De Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016) created
a particular change from quiet to noisy politics induc-
ing (1) an increase of governments’ responsiveness to
citizens’ demands, which simultaneously led to (2) a
decrease of interest groups’ ability to shape a govern-
ment’s position (Culpepper, 2012). This mirrors a pro-
cess leading away “from permissive consensus towards
constraining dissensus,” while spilling “beyond interest
group bargaining into the public sphere” (Hooghe &
Marks, 2009, p. 5). Heated public discussions, gener-
ated by the immediate spotlight on EMU’s weaknesses,
paired with its increased issue salience, induced a broad
actor plurality, ranging from business associations and
trade unions to non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and voters, favoring or opposing reform proposals during
EU level negotiations (Kastner, 2018). Assessing domes-
tic level societal dynamics shaping governments’ pref-
erence formation, and thus reform positions, is a vital
preceding component in comprehending how and why
these positions were pursued at the EU level. Examining
domestic preference formation is hence of importance
when accounting for past, current, and future govern-
ments’ positions towards EU reforms.
Whereas some studies put the positions of mem-
ber states at center stage in explaining Euro crisis deci-
sion making (Degner & Leuffen, 2019a; Schoeller, 2018),
other research involves positions of member govern-
ments in EMU reform, whereby these largely reflect sin-
gle country case studies on France (Rothacher, 2015),
Germany (Degner & Leuffen, 2019b), Italy (Bull, 2018),
Ireland (Hardiman & Metinsoy, 2019) or the UK (Kassim,
James, Warren, & Hargreaves Heap, 2020). These studies
examine whether governments’ preferences are mainly
determined by so-called structural economic factors
or by political considerations (Tarlea, Bailer, & Degner,
2019), or by a “battle of the systems” and a “battle
of ideas” (Van der Veer & Haverland, 2019, p. 1399).
Through application of the societal approach to gov-
ernmental preference formation (Schirm, 2011, 2016,
2020), this article contributes to the literature by examin-
ing both material and ideational considerations towards
the FTT from a domestic level perspective stemming
from a cross-country comparison of three EU govern-
ments’ preference formation processes. It argues that
the Euro crisis may genuinely have enhanced the legiti-
macy of governments’ position taking, particularly dur-
ing the first phase of EU decision making, governmental
preference formation (Degner & Leuffen, 2019b).
Contemporary Eurozone crisis literature points to
the aspects of issue salience and actor plurality usu-
ally through employment of competing European inte-
gration theories such as liberal intergovernmentalism
(Rehm, 2021; Schimmelfennig, 2015), neofunctional-
ism (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015), or post-functionalist
approaches (Puetter, 2012). Csehi and Puetter (2020,
p. 17), having reviewed these theoretical perspectives,
identify government autonomy as a common line of
argument and conclude that most have lost their “‘lib-
eral angle”…with decisions “decoupled from domestic
influences.”’ A particular focus on domestic preference
formation is therefore of importance as, in post-crisis
European financial governance literature, imbalanced
views have emerged that crisis management solutions
were criteria of output legitimacy rather than input legiti-
macy (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2016). Due to the Euro crisis gen-
erating high uncertainty and unknown consequences,
Lodge and Wegrich (2012, p. 1) perceive this output legit-
imacy as a specific “hour of the executive,” leading to a
democratic deficit in decision making, leaving reform ini-
tiatives thus falling short of democratic legitimacy. This is
in line with Bauer and Becker (2014) who argue that the
European Commission gained more influence in imple-
menting governance rules, while Schmidt (2015) under-
lines that reforms were initiated and applied without
public input. This contrasts with the new intergovern-
mentalism literature, which states that “de novo bodies”
increased autonomy, primarily through intergovernmen-
tal coordination within the European Council framework,
resulted in less empowerment of supranational institu-
tions, such as the Commission partly departing from the
Community method (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015,
p. 705). This article aligns with the latter and argues that
the uncertain threatening crisis situation advanced a so-
called “particular environment of democratic citizenship
in flux” (van Loon, 2021, p. 66), with a variety of domestic
actors being well informed and highly concerned about
their governments’ positions in EU reform negotiations.
Literature underlines the importance of governments’
responsiveness to voters during times of political contes-
tation (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 310), or to busi-
ness associations’ efforts in delaying the FTT (Kalaitzake,
2017; Kastner, 2017). Considering governments’ respon-
siveness relating to decision makers prioritizing different
actors with wide-ranging issues, especially during times
of crisis, this article contributes to examining a wide
range of actors situated within three different domes-
tic societies (Ireland, France, and Germany) and instantly
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affected by revamping the EMU framework, in shape of
the FTT. Considering actor plurality and issue salience,
which domestic actors did these governments respond
to during FTT reform discussions and why?
By paying particular attention to the impact of issue
salience and actor plurality, which led to political con-
flicts of a broad range of stakeholders in the domestic
sphere, this study’s analysis encompasses business asso-
ciations, trade unions, NGOs and voters having shaped
the French, German, and Irish domestic preference for-
mation processes. The principal aim is to ascertain who
determined these governments’ responses during the
FTT debate and why, as well as under which circum-
stances some domestic actors were either paid atten-
tion to, or largely ignored in informing these positions.
By applying the societal approach to governmental pref-
erence formation, two explanatory variables, material
interests and value-based ideas, dominant in these coun-
tries’ domestic politics, are investigated to account for
when each of these mattered, how they interacted and
which of these prevailed in the French, German, and
Irish governments’ positions. By means of political dis-
course analysis (PDA), a methodological framework is
employed in which a practical argumentation scheme
highlights the broad public FTT debate. By using sev-
eral premises (circumstance, goal, concern/value, and
target), governments’ responses to and dealing with the
specific reform proposal, are linked for correlation pur-
poses to diverse material interests and value-based ideas
of particular domestic actors (Fairclough & Fairclough,
2011, 2012a, 2012b).
The article proceeds in the following four steps. The
next section, and while touching on several domestic
politics approaches, presents the societal approach to
governmental preference formation. This includes defin-
ing the variables and formulating the core hypotheses.
Subsequently, the PDA framework and operationaliza-
tion of the variables is explained. This is followed by
the empirical case study examining whether the FTT
positions of the governments under scrutiny correspond
to domestic material interests or value-based ideas, or
both, in a cross-country comparison. The last section con-
cludes with a brief comparative summary on the theoret-
ical and empirical findings.
2. Analytical Framework
Due to its distinguished emphasis on endogenous soci-
etal dynamics, material interests and value-based ideas,
dominant in countries’ domestic politics, preceding an
intergovernmental or international bargaining context,
the societal approach to governmental preference for-
mation (Schirm, 2011, 2016, 2020) allows for an explicit
unfolding of the black box in explaining variation in gov-
ernments’ reform positions (van Loon, 2020). A third
explanatory variable applied in this approach, domestic
institutions, is due to space constraints not part of this
analysis. For an elaborative explanation on all variables
and conceptualization of hypotheses, see Schirm (2020).
While employing and augmenting domestic politics the-
ories such as IR liberalism (Moravcsik, 1997), domes-
tic sources of economic policies (Goldstein & Keohane,
1993), as well as varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice,
2001), this approach engages in a unique advancement
of these. Similar to these theories is its core assertion
that elected governments in democratic political systems
aspire to remain in office, ergo their positions mirror soci-
etal actors’ preferences (Schirm, 2013, p. 690). Yet, con-
trary to hailing the importance of either societal interests
or ideas, this analytical instrument embraces both soci-
etal dynamics in explaining governmental preference for-
mation as the dependent variable.
The interrelationship of these societal dynamics has
been endorsed by Hall (1997), Goldstein and Keohane
(1993, p. 25) and Milner (1997, p. 16), yet enthusiasm
to truly explore this interdependence has been lacking
and awaits further theoretical development. The societal
approach to governmental preference formation caters
for a systematic examination of the individual role of
both societal interests and ideas, in supporting or oppos-
ing each other, their interplay and plurality in shaping
governments’ positions. It is essential in “refining” exist-
ing domestic politics approaches both theoretically and
empirically (Schirm, 2020) and consequently, a theory-
guided empirical investigation is solely complete when
it has been determined which of these explanatory vari-
ables accounts for variation across governments’ posi-
tions, and why they do so. Schirm (2018, p. 65) states
that “the conditions for the relative prevalence of either
ideas or interests” has not been anticipated in previ-
ous domestic politics approaches. Through application of
these variables, this article addresses the controversies
around the FTT debate triggering an active involvement
and engagement of domestic actors such as voters and
NGOs. With European financial governance increasingly
touching domestic politics, thereby ‘catalyzing’ a range
of materially and ideationally motivated societal stake-
holders, who aim to shape their respective governments’
positions, justifies employing this approach.
The societal approach to governmental preference
formation, in reflecting previous scholars’ research
outputs, connects domestic actors’ specific attribu-
tions: Encompassing and furthering Milner (1997) and
Moravcsik (1997), the material interest variable is delin-
eated as economic sectors’ distributional calculations
adjusting swiftly to changes in the European (interna-
tional) economy through FTT introduction. Furthermore,
while connections with Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993)
as well as Moravcsik’s (1997) work are echoed, the
variable value-based ideas is defined as voters’ endur-
ing joint expectations on apt government FTT manage-
ment. As this article expands its examination to a broad
array of stakeholders, supplementary domestic actors
are involved in the analysis (van Loon, 2021; van Loon,
in press): Trade unions complement the domestic mate-
rially motivated business associations as sources for
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material interests, while NGOs enhance the ideation-
ally motivated voters’ examination as sources for value-
based ideas. The variables’ precise characterization sup-
ports three individual hypotheses’ articulation on the
conditions for prevalence in shaping governments’ posi-
tions. These central hypotheses explain the impact of
economic sectors (material interests) and societal expec-
tations (value-based ideas): When economic sectors face
meaningful distributional calculations, material interests
predominate in shaping governments’ FTT positions, due
to intense lobbying; and when fundamental questions on
the role of politics in managing the economy are affected,
ideas will prevail in shaping governments’ FTT positions
(Schirm, 2016, p. 69). A third hypothesis accounts for
the variables’ interplay: When both cost-benefit calcula-
tions for economic sectors as well as fundamental soci-
etal expectations on governments’ apt role in managing
the economy are affected, then these either compete
and weaken, or reinforce and strengthen each other in
shaping governments’ FTT positions.
3. Operationalization
Fairclough and Fairclough’s research in political respond-
ing to and dealing with the financial and Eurozone cri-
sis views PDA mainly as a type of “practical argumenta-
tion” which “demands systematic analysis” of arguments
for or against particular types of governments’ actions
(Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012a, pp. 1–2). Such govern-
ments’ responses shed light on the broad public debate
on the causes of the crisis in general, as well as par-
ticularly on reforms proposed. In arguing practically in
support or opposition of reform proposals, these are
linked to the diverse concerns/values of domestic actors.
Arguing practically over particular types of actions, in the
crisis context of uncertainty and risk, is designed to lead
to a reasonable and legitimate outcome precisely in the
absence of consensus:
In a modern democratic state, people expect politi-
cians to be bound by the promises they make, and
expect the institutions of the state to act justly and
treat them as equals. Action based on such rea-
sons is legitimate both because a concern with doing
one’s duty or fulfill ing one’s obligations enjoys pub-
lic recognition, but also because these reasons can
be argumentatively and publicly justified as insti-
tutional facts, regardless of whether agents want
to act in accordance with them or not. (Fairclough
& Fairclough, 2012b, p. 26; see also Fairclough &
Fairclough, 2012a, p. 177)
In this sense, PDA is attached to domestic individual
and collective actors (interest groups, trade unions, vot-
ers, NGOs, and governments) involved in political pro-
cesses within institutional contexts, in which these actors
can engage, in an environment of uncertainty, risk
and disagreement on decisions on matters of common
concerns/values. According to Fairclough and Fairclough
(2012a, p. 34), giving primacy to practical argumenta-
tion means:
Carefully weighing a variety of relevant considera-
tions…in a democratic setting where a wide range of
viewpoints can be expressed and taken into account,
will not only produce a legitimate decision…but will
also enhance the rationality of the decision-making
process.
In applying PDA, the authors establish a framework, ana-
lyzing a claim for action (action to be pursued) which
is distinguished from the premises illustrating the cir-
cumstances of action (current context) from premises
expressing the goals of action (future state of affairs)—
which, in turn, are explicitly informed by values and con-
cerns (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012a, p. 15). Fairclough
and Fairclough (2012a, p. 44) propose practical argumen-
tation which, inserted within the context of this study of
the FTT, can be applied by taking the following system-
atic steps: (1) in accordance with material interests (con-
cerns) and/or value-based ideas (values), and (2) given
the actual problematic context of action (circumstances),
as well as (3) the desired future state of affairs (goals);
(4) the solution to the problem is the action to be pur-
sued (target). Therefore, concluding that the action to
be pursued will be the right means to achieve the goal,
the link from the premises to conclusion is done by a pre-
sumptive means-end relation that goes from the actual
circumstances to the future current state of affairs.
This empirical analysis examines whether the three
governments’ FTT positions, expressed in statements
of responsible elected politicians (finance minister and
head of government), correlated with either (1) interest-
related indicators articulated by business associations’
and trade unions’ demands in the form of posi-
tion papers and representatives’ statements, or to
(2) ideational-related indicators such as voters’ and
NGOs’ attitudes as indicated by public opinion polls
and positions papers, or if in fact (3) a correlation
occurred between interest and ideational-related indi-
cators. Concerning public opinion surveys, societal atti-
tudes from the Eurobarometer are highlighted, as well
as one dyad of value-based ideas on the role of the
government in steering the economy: trust in govern-
ment’s regulation versus trust in market forces (Schirm,
2011, p. 50).
4. The Proposed European FTT
After the failure of the 2010 G20 Toronto Summit in
reaching agreement on globally coordinated action to tax
the financial sector, President of the Commission, José
Barroso, proposed a Directive in September 2011 to cre-
ate a harmonized broad-based FTT in response to the
global financial and Euro crises. To serve as an example
of potential global implementation, the FTT was to be
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installed by member governments. This tax was “to make
the financial sector pay its fair share [and] to reduce com-
petitive distortions in the single market, discourage risky
trading activities and complement regulatory measures
aimed at avoiding future crises” (European Commission,
2011). Many member governments contested the FTT
mainly due to the risks of hindering growth and financial
sector relocation. Once unanimity to pass the proposal
proved difficult to achieve, the most reluctant govern-
ments such as Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK were
bypassed primarily by Germany and France in request-
ing the Commission to introduce the enhanced coopera-
tion mechanism. This would permit those favorable FTT
member states to participate in implementing the tax.
The mechanism was supported by 11 EU member states
representing more than 90% of Eurozone GDP and was
approved by the European Parliament in December 2012
and the Council of the EU in January 2013. However,
FTT introduction still lingers in uncertainty. Statements
of support mainly come from Germany and France, regu-
larly putting the FTT on the ECOFIN agenda to advance
the issue and renew the political commitment of the
remaining member governments. Contemporary devel-
opments seem to slightly accelerate this process, as
Brexit and the subsequent exclusion of the UK as a ‘foot-
dragger’ (Quaglia, 2017, p. 1) in blocking FTT negotia-
tions, and the current COVID19-pandemic crisis, have ini-
tiated the German Council Presidency, to call on EU mem-
bers’ “solidarity, cooperation and joint solutions” to fund
the EU’s budget and “manage the economic effects” in
response to the corona virus (German Federal Ministry
of Finance, 2020).
4.1. German, French, and Irish Governments’ Positions
From the perspective of the French and German govern-
ments, the political context of action (circumstances) was
similar in their basic features. At the beginning of the
crisis Christine Lagarde, French Finance Minister, stated
in the Assemblée Nationale that it was “the result of a
deregulation of liberalism” (Assemblée Nationale, 2009).
Her successor François Baroin added, referring to inter-
national structures, that “if we wait for a consensus
and a global agreement, this tax will not be introduced”
(Assemblée Nationale, 2012b). Referring to the lack of
regulation of the financial markets identified, Lagarde
stated as a solution to the problem (target premise) “to
rebuild the rules that ensure the smooth functioning of
the markets” (Assemblée Nationale, 2009). Baroin also
demanded that “the financial system should contribute
to repairing the damage it has itself caused by devel-
oping a financial industry that got carried away with
subprime mortgages and Lehman Brothers” (Assemblée
Nationale, 2012a).
Similarly interpreting the circumstances, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel stated in the Bundestag that
the “financial crisis could only have arisen because
the regulation of the financial markets was insuffi-
cient” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012). German Finance
Minister Wolfgang Schäuble estimated the “chances
of us achieving a global financial transaction tax…very
small” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010c). Schäuble added
that the “lack of regulation of the financial markets”
was one cause, but the main cause was the “excess
of public debt in the national budgets” (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2011) and thus gave higher priority to reduc-
ing public debt. Merkel’s target premise was again sim-
ilar when she stated that “there is no way around the
fact that the financial sector is sharing the costs of
the crisis” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010b). In addition,
Merkel exceeded Lagarde’s regulatory ideas with her
demand that “every financial center, every financial mar-
ket player and every financial product should be sub-
ject to regulation, if possible not only in Germany, if
possible not only in Europe, but if possible everywhere
in the world” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012). This should
“restore the primacy of politics over the financial mar-
kets” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010a).
The Irish government’s position is in stark contrast to
the German and French positions in terms of the polit-
ical context of action (circumstances). In the discussion
in the Dáil Éireann on the introduction of a European
FTT, Prime Minister Enda Kenny emphasized that the
financial sector was a “very important sector for Ireland”
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012a), as “32,000 peo-
ple are directly employed in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin, which is the location of more
than 5,000 firms” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012a).
The International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) is thus
not only “an important part of the economy” (Houses of
the Oireachtas, 2012b), but “vital to the Irish economy”
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012c), as the financial sector
contributes “€2.1 billion in corporate and payroll taxes to
the Irish Exchequer” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012a).
Accordingly, the Irish government primarily focused on
the relevance of its financial sector. Kenny expressed the
target premise of “continuing to adopt, articulate and
implement a clear vision for the future of the IFSC and
demonstrating Ireland’s commitment to the promotion
and growth of this sector” (Houses of the Oireachtas,
2012a). This target premise of the Irish government, by
focusing on promoting the national economy, contrasts
with the German and French stances, bearing in mind
that Ireland also opposed the FTT due to the UK’s resis-
tance (Hardiman & Metinsoy, 2019).
4.2. German, French, and Irish Domestic Material
Interests
As a representative of the German credit institutions,
the Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft (DK) warned that a
FTT “because of possible evasive reactions, is fiscally
justifiable—if at all—only if it is introduced globally or at
least EU-wide (EU-27)” (DK, 2011, p. 2). From the DK’s
perspective, the financial sector is “not undertaxed com-
pared to other sectors of the economy” and “even if it
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were introduced at the international level, many prob-
lems would still arise” (DK, 2011, pp. 6, 10). In addition,
the association stressed:
That the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax
would have negative consequences not only for finan-
cial institutions, but also for companies and citizens in
general, as well as for the economy and financial loca-
tions of the affected states as a whole. (DK, 2011, p. 2)
The Fédération Bancaire Française (FBF), equal to the
DK, argued that “the financial sector, and in particular
the banking sector, contributes as much and perhaps
even more than others to public charges in the broad-
est sense” and that “in this context the…financial trans-
action tax (FTT) is not legitimate” (FBF, 2011). The FBF
similarly argued that “a tax on financial transactions
can only be conceived on a global level to maintain
the competitive conditions of the financial centers and
not to penalize the market financing of European com-
panies” (FBF, 2011). The rejection of the FTT, whether
national or regional, highlights the concerns premise of
these national business associations clearly reflecting
the national locational advantage in international com-
petition and the relevance of this, as it would harm
the financial sector. Thus, the interests of the German
and French financial sectors conflicted with the respec-
tive government positions that advocated FTT introduc-
tion. The Irish Banking Federation, in cooperation with
Financial Services Ireland (FSI), commissioned a study
on the advantages and disadvantages of an FTT. The
aim of the study was “to independently review and
distil the main points…on the European Commission’s
initial…and the subsequent authorized proposal for an
FTT…to provide an indication of the expected impact
of the FTT across the financial services sector and its
constituent product groups” (PWC, 2013). Based on this
report, Brendan Bruen, Director of the FSI, concluded
that “Ireland has made the right decision to stay out of
any FTT” as it “harms any country that introduces one”
and “is ultimately paid by the real economy, in increased
costs for business, lost jobs and lost payroll” (FSI, 2013).
With the Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) and
the Confédération française démocratique du travail
(CFDT), the largest trade union federations in Germany
and France spoke out in favor of the introduction of a
European FTT. The CFDT supported a campaign by the
European Federation of Public Service Unions, which
focused on the demand for “fairer and more progressive
taxation” in the form of a “European financial tax” as
it believed it to be “high time that the financial sector
also paid its share” (CFDT, 2011). The DGB contradicted
the view of the German financial sector that a FTT “must
be introduced worldwide” and supported “the introduc-
tion of a Financial Transaction Tax in the EU…even if the
rest of the world community does not follow suit,” so
that “financial speculators, as the cause of the finan-
cial and economic crisis, to share in its consequential
costs” (DGB, 2011). This echoes the view of the ICTU,
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, while adding that the
FTT contributes:
To state revenue at a time when the state finances
are under unprecedented pressure and it shows cit-
izens that the institutions which were the main cul-
prits in our economic collapse are making some con-
tribution towards a recovery. It will alter economic
behaviour by making risky transactions more costly,
while in turn allowing a more rational allocation of
economic resources. (ICTU, 2012)
The trade unions’ demands (concerns premise) for a
European FTT correlates with the German and French
governments’ positions. The financial sector is to be held
accountable through stronger regulation and the respon-
sibility for the costs of the crisis is accompanied by a
sense of justice, which the German and French govern-
ments also emphasized, yet diverged from the Irish gov-
ernment’s stance.
4.3. German, French, and Irish Domestic Value-Based
Ideas
To illustrate the increased issue salience, the importance
the public attached to the FTT reform proposal and its
subsequent politicization, media analyses from Kastner
(2017) and Degner and Leuffen (2019b) confirm that
public attention increased instantly, particularly during
the years 2011 to 2013. Concerning the question of an
apt government’s role in managing the economy and
trust in governments regulation versus trust in market
forces, highlighting the values premise, weak governmen-
tal regulation of the financial sector enjoyed support
among the Irish population. In a Eurobarometer survey
recurring since 2010, respondents were asked to indicate
whether they support or oppose specific EU measures.
In Ireland, on average 44% supported the introduction
of a FTT, compared to 43% who opposed it. These fig-
ures are very different from the results in Germany (75%
pro/16% contra) and France (64% pro/24% contra; see
EUOPD, 2014–2018). The enforcement of the EU Troika’s
bailout program, including conditions of austerity mea-
sures imposed on the Irish society to decrease govern-
ment expenditure, might have contributed to this dif-
ference in Irish attitudes towards FTT introduction. The
German and French governments’ target premise of hav-
ing the financial sector share the costs of the crisis is
reflected in a Eurobarometer survey recurring since 2013.
When asked whether the EU is ensuring that the finan-
cial sector pays its fair share, 21% of French and 37%
of German (as well as Irish) respondents surveyed felt
that the financial sector is paying its fair share. A major-
ity of 55% of French respondents felt that the EU was
not holding the financial sector sufficiently accountable.
In Germany and Ireland, 50% each shared this view
(EUOPD, 2014–2018). In the FTT debate, the emphasized
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value of fairness (the financial sector must pay its fair
share) can be correlated to the values equality, justice,
and freedom. In the question of whether “[we need]
more equality and justice, even if this means less free-
dom for the individual” (EUOPD, 2014–2018), an abso-
lute majority of respondents in Germany (62%), Ireland
(63%) and France (64%) voted on average for the val-
ues of equality and justice, whereas in contrast, 31%
(France), 25% (Ireland), 34% (Germany) preferred the
value freedom.
The internationally active NGO Tax Justice Network,
which maintains partnerships with the Tax Justice
Network Germany and Attac France, contributed to
the debate on the introduction of a Europe-wide FTT.
The Tax Justice Network advocated “the introduction of a
Financial Transaction Tax because only this is suitable for
financing current crisis management measures and for
preventing or at least mitigating future crises” (Netzwerk
Steuergerechtigkeit Deutschland, 2010). In addition, the
Network for Tax Justice was one of 100 other spon-
sors of the German nationwide campaign ‘Tax against
Poverty’ (Steuer gegen Armut). An open letter, which
forms the basis of the campaign, states: “[We want] to
ensure that the financial sector contributes to overcom-
ing the consequences of the crisis” (Steuer gegen Armut,
2009). Attac France viewed the introduction of a FTT
as a service to social justice, as it would “shift the bur-
den of the crisis from the citizens to the financial sec-
tor” (Attac France, 2010). It celebrated the Commission’s
proposal for a pan-European FTT as a “victory for Attac’s
ideas” but regretted that “the proposed rate is only
0.01%” and that “the scope of the proposal…is limited by
the exclusion of taxation of transactions on the foreign
exchange market” and hence, the proposal is “too little,
too late” (Attac France, 2011). The NGO Financial Justice
Ireland called for an “EU-wide financial transaction tax”
(Financial Justice Ireland, 2014) “to reclaim what we
have paid out to banks and ‘bail-outs”’ (Financial Justice
Ireland, 2013b). “Part of the FTT revenue should be used
to repay part of the bank debt in the global North and
South” (Financial Justice Ireland, 2013a). The positions
of the NGOs show a strong consensus on the demands
(values premise) for a Europe-wide FTT and reveal that
the planned FTT introduction not only affects the mate-
rial interests (concerns premise) of the financial sector
but also societal expectations about the role of the gov-
ernment in managing the financial market. The positions
of the German and French NGOs are consistent with their
respective government positions in their claim for action
to demand a European FTT and in their target premises
of making the financial sector share in the costs by regu-
lating the financial system and the associated values of
equality and justice. On the other hand, the rejection
of a FTT in the Irish government’s claim for action cor-
relates neither with the position of Irish NGOs nor with
the widespread demands in Irish society for equality and
justice in the financial markets.
5. Conclusion
Both the German and French governments’ context
of action (circumstances) to introduce a FTT at the
European level is in line with the demands of the vot-
ers, of NGOs and trade unions, and runs counter to the
material interests of the financial sector, which consid-
ered the introduction of a FTT at the European level to
be harmful to the economy. These governments’ target
premises of using the FTT to regulate the financial sector
and make it share the costs of the crisis can be plausi-
bly explained by the high approval rates for a European
FTT and the widespread view, expressed by the trade
unions and NGOs, that the financial sector has not been
held sufficiently accountable. In the analysis of the Irish
government’s position, it deviates from the German and
French governments’ stances, correlating in its circum-
stances with the material interests of the financial sector,
as well as with the expectations of the Irish voters, which,
unlike in the German and French cases, did not support
the introduction of a FTT at the European level with an
absolute majority.
Reflecting these empirical results, the hypotheses of
the societal approach to governmental preference for-
mation and its explanatory variables, material interests
and value-based ideas, account for when these mattered,
how they interacted, and which prevailed in shaping
these governments’ FTT positions. The first formulated
hypothesis focused on the prevalence of business associ-
ations and trade unions in shaping the governments’ FTT
positions. Strengthening EU financial regulation would
directly affect specific economic sectors, leading to cost-
benefit calculations instigating these domestic actors
to engage in vocal lobbying efforts, thus dominating
domestic preference formation. The comparative empir-
ical analysis on material interests reveals that these actor
types were divided regarding their FTT demands. Due to
the role they play in the national economy, contributing
to employment, exports and GVA, more so for Ireland
than for France and Germany, business associations were
highly opposed to strengthening financial integration.
Trade unions, specified as material interests due to the
importance of labor to the national economy, were sup-
portive of the FTT as they blamed the finance sector for
the dire economic situation, which had induced unem-
ployment and immense costs for the taxpayer. The FTT,
in punishing the financial sector, would raise revenues
and contribute to political stability, economic prosperity,
and social security.
The second hypothesis turned attention to voters’
and NGOs’ concerns if strengthening EU financial regu-
lation involves fundamental and salient enduring soci-
etal expectations on apt government’s role in steering
the economy. The cross-country comparison illustrated
that all NGOs had a unified position towards FTT intro-
duction. French and German public opinion were more
in line regarding pro-regulation versus pro-market atti-
tudes, while in Ireland trust in market forces reflected
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the negative correlation to strengthening financial mar-
ket regulation. This equally corresponds to the large per-
centage of French and Germans in favor of the FTT, yet
also complies with the Irish public opinion being largely
divided over this tax issue.
So far, this article has highlighted the importance
of both domestic explanatory variables, whereby it has
become clear that not only competition took place within
these variables in the three country case studies (mate-
rial interests: finance and business industries versus trade
unions) or in Ireland only (value-based ideas: NGOs versus
voters) but competition took also place between these
societal dynamics, hence they can also reinforce each
other. The third hypothesis concentrated on the variables’
interplay: The strengthening of financial regulation would
directly affect cost-benefit calculations as well as funda-
mental enduring societal expectations on the apt govern-
ment’s role in steering the economy. The comparative
empirical examination has supported that trade unions’
demands collided with these from finance and indus-
try associations, thus a certain weakening of the latter
demands took place in the domestic preference forma-
tion processes. This weakening occurred more so since,
particularly in France and Germany, trade unions were
joined by both voters and NGOs in their support for the
FTT, thereby reinforcing each other. Hence, an interaction
between the societal dynamics took place. In Ireland’s
domestic preference formation process, business associ-
ations’ opposition was most likely reinforced by the pub-
lic’s divided opinion. Not having been able to form a solid
positive attitude towards the FTT, the regulation-adverse
attitudes reinforced the material interests opposed to
financial strengthening. Hence, in France and Germany
trade unions, voters and NGOs were able to circumvent
the business associations’ interests and were thus more
decisive in shaping its government’s position towards sup-
porting the proposed reform, whereas in Ireland these
domestic actors were ultimately not able to counter a
unified financial industry overwhelmingly opposing the
tax. In sum, this article has illustrated that, even in an
uncertain crisis situation in which governments have to
act prompt, a broad range of directly affected domestic
stakeholders were able to voice their concerns in shaping
the governments’ responsiveness, hence public input in
the FTT reform negotiations genuinely enhanced the legit-
imacy of governments’ FTT position taking.
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